Time To Reconsider a Jordan-Palestine Confederation

Jan. 7—With President Donald Trump having lobbed his radical Gaza reconstruction proposal into the middle of the debate over a post-war solution to the Israeli-Palestine conflict, and issue of broader relations among the states in the region, it were important to hear other proposals that could pose a direction for solutions.

The proposal coming from “agent of chaos” Trump is not fixed and is being deliberately misrepresented as such. As several sources close to the President have explained, Trump really does want to hear other ideas, should they come from either Arab states or Israel, that deal with a future of peace and prosperity for Israelis, Palestinians, and their neighbors. But such solutions must also address the emergency threat to human life in Gaza created by the Butcher of Gaza, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin (“Bibi”) Netanyahu’s war of extermination against Palestinians in Gaza, that has deliberately transformed an already wretched land into a place uninhabitable.

To take control of what Trump has rightly called a “demolition site” infested with tons of unexploded munitions, will, before any significant construction begins, require some dislocation and resettlement of the more than 2 million Gazan Palestinians, or at least the majority of them, to one or more sites in one or more other counties—at least until human living conditions are restored to Gaza. The reports and even some tweets from Trump himself, have been interpreted by many as saying that such resettlement is permanent and that the U.S., which Trump is proposing to take charge of the area during the massive rebuild, would continue its occupation after the build-out is completed.

But sources close to the President say that what he really wants to do is to turn the area back to the Palestinians, and that area could become the lynchpin of a viable Palestinian state. Trump has proposed that Jordan, which is already 70% Palestinian and whose Queen is Palestinian, to be one of the resettlement sites for Gazans—something Jordan’s King Abdullah II has rejected. Trump will no doubt be discussing this with the King when he meets with him at the White House February 11.

What the two leaders might also want to discuss is the idea of creating a more stable and viable Palestinian State as part of a confederation with Jordan. This idea was revived Jan. 29 by former Israeli Deputy National Security Advisor Chuck Freilich in an opinion piece in Haaretz. In order to further the ongoing discussion about a pathway to peace in the region, we present that article below.

Israel Won the War. This Is How Trump Can Help It Win the Peace

Stop the mindless ‘two-state solution’ mantra. It’s time to revisit the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, and U.S. President Donald Trump’s as yet half-baked but axiom-breaking diplomatic approach may actually help.

by Chuck Freilich

Jan 29, 2025

The Iranian-led axis of resistance lies in smoldering ruins. Hamas has been defeated militarily and Gaza devastated. Hezbollah, the pride and vanguard of Iran’s efforts to spread its regional influence, has been eviscerated, with some 70% of its massive missile and drone arsenals destroyed in just weeks.

The Assad regime in Syria, Iran’s staunchest ally, collapsed, and all indications are that the new Sunni Islamist regime will be highly antagonistic toward Tehran. Only the Houthis in Yemen still stand, but they were never fully part of the axis and are the focus of growing American, allied, and Israeli attacks. At least some of the hostages are now returning home from Gaza.

Iran itself is vulnerable as never before, following Israel’s reported destruction of its air defense system and much of its missile arsenal. Iran’s entire strategy for defeating and destroying Israel, by surrounding it with an insurmountable “ring of fire,” has crumbled, leading to a furious debate in Tehran regarding its future course. An attempt to fully resurrect the axis would cost tens of billions of dollars desperately needed for domestic purposes, take years and likely prove futile: what was destroyed once can be destroyed again, and far more easily

What a difference a little over a year can make, after Israel suffered the worst day in its history with its vaunted military reeling and its overall strategic circumstances desperate. The cease-fire deals will not prevent Hamas from reconstituting in Gaza, or Hezbollah [from reconstituting] in Lebanon, or Iran from resupplying both. Nevertheless, Israel has won the war, and wars are fought for political purposes.

With the Palestinians, probably not—unless the United States and much of the world stop mindlessly espousing the mantra of a two-state solution and begin to explore alternative means of achieving peace. The Americans only adopted the two-state paradigm some two decades ago. What is important is the end state—a viable long-term peace—not the specific means of getting there.

Nothing is more important for Israel’s future than separation from the Palestinians. But it is time to come to terms with the probable demise of the two-state solution. I say this as a heretofore lifelong supporter of this paradigm.

When it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peace, many suffer from the old definition of insanity: repeatedly doing the same thing and hoping for a different outcome.

A two-state solution in the West Bank, directly adjacent to Israel’s population centers, in which Hamas may gain control? Where the ironclad security arrangements essential for a withdrawal are no longer realistic following October 7, and where Israeli settlements dot much of the territory? In Gaza, where Hamas is likely to retain at least some political control, even if an alternative governing body is established, and is just waiting for the next round?

A two-state solution that Palestinian leaders have repeatedly rejected and which no one on the Palestinian side can agree to at least for the foreseeable future, if ever? One which the current Israeli government opposes and whose likely successor will be from the center-right, moderate on most issues, but stymied on the Palestinians?

Time to try something else. In this case, going back to the future with an updated version of the old idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, one that would include over 90% of the West Bank, together with Gaza and Jordan.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s as yet half-baked, at best, proposal that Jordan and Egypt absorb something like 1.5 million Palestinians from Gaza might be massaged to fit with the confederation idea. But at least it indicates a willingness to break with long-existing international axioms about the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Jordan’s population is at least 70% Palestinian, including the king’s wife, meaning that his heir is half-Palestinian and Jordan’s future largely Palestinian. Admittedly, Jordan’s demise has been predicted ever since its establishment, yet it has proven to be one of the most stable Arab states. Demography, however, is ultimately destiny, and the ruling Hashemite minority has long feared the growing Palestinian majority.

Much as supporters of the two-state paradigm correctly warn of the long-term demographic ramifications for Israel’s future if it is not achieved, the same logic must be applied to Jordan—only more so. In Israel’s case, the Palestinians would constitute “just” 40% of the population even four decades from now, as far out as the demographic projections go.

Nothing would appear to be more natural then than a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, i.e., two states constitutionally committed to the conduct of a common foreign and defense policy, but that remain independent in all other ways. In 1972, then-King Hussein himself raised the idea of a “United Arab Kingdom,” similar to the United Kingdom, in Jordan and the West Bank. Since then, however, the monarchy has come to fear that this would lead to Jordan’s takeover by the Palestinians and to strenuously oppose it. Some Palestinians have argued that a confederation would have to be preceded by Palestinian independence.

For the confederative paradigm to become viable, the monarchy would have to be convinced not only that it does not constitute a threat to its interests, but the opposite.

To this end, the confederation’s constitution would both guarantee the Hashemite kingdom’s future, and the king would be provided with veto power over government policy, as well as given special emergency powers—both subject to an override by a majority of the parliaments of the two constituent states. Other measures to assuage Jordanian fears might also be adopted.

For the Palestinians, it would be independence in all but name, which they would declare concurrently with the establishment of the confederation. They would gain responsibility for all areas of their national life, with the partial exception of foreign and defense policy, where they would share equal powers with Jordan in a joint cabinet.

Moreover, they would enjoy the benefits of joining a larger state with a functioning government and economy, effective military, an outlet to the Red Sea, and access to the broader Arab world, rather than being surrounded by Israel and Jordan in a tiny, landlocked two-state solution. Both the Palestinian and Jordanian components of the confederation would be the beneficiaries of large-scale international assistance.

With Jordan’s proven record in maintaining the peace and ensuring security on its long border with Israel, Israel would gain confidence both that a Palestinian state would not become an unstable, radical and irredentist entity still bent on its destruction, and in the viability of the security arrangements without which no one in Israel, left or right, will support a deal.

The territorial withdrawal would still be a hard sell in Israel, politically. But for most of its population, which does not support annexation of the West Bank, this proposal might make all the difference. Most importantly, it would guarantee Israel’s long-term future as a predominantly Jewish and democratic state.

A Palestinian-Jordanian confederation would constitute a welcome outcome for the moderate Arab states, who support Palestinian independence but fear its potentially destabilizing consequences. For the U.S. and international community, too, which seek a long-term resolution to the conflict but are less invested in its precise nature, this would be a welcome alternative to the ongoing stasis.

A viable long-term solution would also have to be found to the unique problems posed by Gaza. This is where Egypt, which together with Jordan, shares responsibility with Israel for the emergence of the Palestinian problem, could make a critical contribution to peace based on a multilateral land swap.

Egypt would provide Gaza with additional territory equal in size to the area that Israel would retain in the West Bank (less than 10%); Israel would compensate Egypt with equal territory along their common border; and the Palestinians would agree to Israel’s retention of the piece of the West Bank. In so doing, Israel and the Palestinians would gain territory of critical importance to them, but neither they nor Egypt would lose territory overall.

Palestinians, Israelis, and Jordanians have long demonstrated their ability to derail attempts to impose solutions on them. For this proposal to work, as with others, they would have to overcome their existential fears and be convinced that it addresses their primary national aspirations. The U.S. role is critical.

Only the Americans might have the wherewithal to do so, and it will take time and effort. Even so, a new government would have to be elected in Israel and a pragmatic Palestinian leadership would have to emerge. The Jordanians might require the most convincing.

Trump may be tempted to present a new version of his “deal of the century”—the abortive two-state peace proposal from his first term that would have provided the Palestinians with 70% of the West Bank and Israel 30%. The proposal was roundly rejected by both sides: by the Palestinians, because it did not give them enough; and by the Israelis, because it gave the Palestinians too much. Given the changing regional dynamics, the prospects of a similar proposal being more successful are even poorer today.

The confederation proposal is certainly a tall order, but Trump has a proven tendency to ignore long-standing diplomatic orthodoxies and favor different approaches. The alternative—ongoing failure to achieve progress, punctuated by recurring violence—is far worse.

Chuck Freilich, a former deputy national security adviser in Israel, is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and an adjunct professor at Columbia and Tel Aviv universities.