The Beast-Men Who Made and Dropped the Bomb

A Tragedy in Three Acts

The Beast-Men Who Made and Dropped the Bomb

by L. Wolfe

This article was first published in 21st Century Science & Technology, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 22-39. Drawing on original research, historian L. Wolfe shows that the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 was the result of a conspiracy of political and moral opponents of Franklin D. Roosevelt, aiming to control the post-war world with the ultimate weapon of terror.

%%Introduction 

A little more than 59 years ago, the United States of America, a nation founded on principles that distinguish men from beasts, dropped two atomic bombs on the already militarily-defeated nation of Japan, slaughtering more than 300,000 innocent people and plunging the world into the darkness of “nuclear terror.” Over the course of the intervening years, most Americans have been given a fairy-tale story to explain how those bombs came into being and how and why they were dropped on Japan. (fn1) It is to counter such fairy tales and lies that I present what follows.

Dedication

This article is dedicated to the immortal spirit of the great American scientist and patriot, Dr. Robert J. Moon. It was a comment by this universal thinker that inspired me to investigate the true origins of the atomic bombing of Japan. He told me that, in his view, the Manhattan Project, in which he had played a crucial role, stood as one of mankind’s greatest scientific achievements; yet, it could lead to the destruction of science itself.

Dr. Moon warned that the Project had taught scientists that great breakthroughs and accomplishments could now only be achieved at the patronage of an evil and secretive financial and political establishment; if the hold of such people over science were not broken, they would ultimately destroy human civilization.

Dr. Moon dedicated his life to fighting against such a dismal possibility and for a more hopeful future. It was this commitment that brought him into contact with the LaRouche movement and myself, and for that I am forever grateful.

Lyndon LaRouche has said that it is the task of a competent historian to present history in much the same way that a great playwright would, placing his characters on a stage and having their interplay and actions move the drama forward. Such history is alive for one’s readers, as it unfolds on the stage of their imagination. 

We shall tell the story of the bomb and its use, in just such a fashion, as if you are looking over the shoulder or through minds’ eyes of those involved. As you shall see, there is an immediate parallel to the events of today, where the utopian heirs of those Beast-Men who first gave us and then used the atomic bomb, now try to create even more horrific nuclear weapons for use in their “preemptive” wars today. They use the same method of lies and distortion to achieve their ends as the Beast-Men who promoted the creation and use of the atomic bomb. 

We also can see the impotence of “powerful” establishment figures, whose Hamlet-like indecision and fear of taking difficult or unknown paths when confronted with the stark horror of the bomb, leads to an inevitable tragedy; an establishment mired in its false axioms can never “save” us, for they cannot even save themselves. (fn2)

We will limit the scope of what we present here to the making of the decisions to start the U.S. atomic weapons program, to then carry forward with development of the bomb, and, finally, in the post-FDR period, to drop two bombs on Japan—a decision made by a little and stupid man, Harry S Truman, under the thrall of his own Rasputin, the evil Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes, much as our current stupid President is manipulated by his puppet-master, Vice-President Dick Cheney. We shall foreshorten the first two acts of our drama, telling only the essential features, so that we shall leave more room for its final, terrible conclusion. 

Let us provide the setting for this tragedy. As our story begins, it is the summer of 1939, the last days of a false peace before the outbreak of the worst war in human history. For some time, a fight has been raging within the financial oligarchy over the Nazi golem that had been their creation. One group, the hard-core Synarchist financiers, still see Adolf Hitler as a means to first destroy the power of Russia in Europe, then to conquer that continent, and then ultimately, to destroy their main target—the United States. Another faction sees that the unstable Hitler and his Nazis must be destroyed and, reluctantly, accept that the U.S. is needed to accomplish this. (fn3).

Both groupings are rife with proponents of the utopian views of H.G. Wells and Lord Bertrand Russell about the possibility of development of a terrible super-weapon that might give these oligarchs the ability terrorize the world to accept a fascist “world government.” It is within such deranged utopian minds that the plot to create nuclear “Beast-Man” is hatched, to lay the basis for a post-Nazi reign of permanent terror. (fn4)

Act I

The Selling of the Bomb

Scene 1—The Manic Hungarian 

A group of men are meeting to discuss the potentials emerging from the exciting news that the splitting of the atom and the release of energy has been achieved. The men are all emigrants, having come to America to escape Nazi persecution and almost certain death; they are all Jews, all nuclear physicists. 

Their entry into the U.S. has been steered—or more precisely, arranged, through the networks of the Jewish Agency Rescue Committee. (fn5) They don’t really know it, but they were brought here just so they might have the discussion they are now having. The group that is meeting, at several locations, mostly in New York City, is known among themselves and other scientists as the “Hungarian Conspiracy,” its principle members all being somewhat “mad Hungarians.” Among its leading members are Leo Szilard, who is already becoming acquainted with Lord Bertrand Russell, then based in United States at the University of Chicago; young Edward Teller of George Washington University in Washington, D.C.; and Eugene Wigner. (fn6) 

The group is being harangued by Szilard, an “over the top” proponent of whatever he happened to be advocating at the moment. His obsession is a very “hyper” evaluation that the Nazis were well on their way to building what he called a “nuclear super-weapon;” if they should build this first, he shouted, it would be the end of the world as we know it. (fn7) 

The “Hungarian Conspiracy” decides to approach the most famous scientist and physicist of their day, Albert Einstein, who, like them, is a refugee from Nazi tyranny, now residing in the U.S. 

Scene 2—The ‘Godfather’ of the Bomb 

Watching over what is happening, but not quite ready yet to intervene is the group’s “godfather,” the financier Alexander Sachs, who is really the “godfather of the bomb.” Formerly a managing director of the New York investment bank Lehman Bros., Sachs is also a director of the powerful fondi, the Société Générale de Belgique, which can trace its origins directly to the House of Orange. It was Sachs, working with the JARC, which had brought the scientists to the U.S., secured postings for them at various universities, and provided them with funding. He has been a critical link, between the financier interests represented by Société Générale, which we call the Synarchists, and certain financial networks in this country. (fn8) 

Sachs came to the U.S. from Russia in 1904. Although of humble background, he was put through elite Harvard University, for a degree in economics, and then taken under the wing of Kuhn Loeb head Jacob Schiff, the British Royal Family’s chief financial operative in the U.S. (fn9) Schiff dispatched Sachs into Lehman Bros., whose foreign operations, he, Schiff, had personally established. (fn10) 

Sachs, a Jew, has “joined” the faction, which includes UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill (who created for himself the post of Minister of Defence), among others, who are interested in stopping Hitler. They want an American bomb built and used, because, in their utopian views, such a bomb can be used to terrorize and control a post-war, post Hitler world. Sachs has been chosen as the financier’s “man on the scene” for the bomb project, because, of his perceived friendship with the American President, Franklin Roosevelt. (fn11) 

Scene 3—The Great Scientist Is Used 

The Hungarians go to see Einstein in June and discuss the approach to the Belgians. Einstein is told by the hysterical Szilard of the “Nazi threat” and potential threat of the Nazi seizure of uranium in the Congo, should Belgium fall to the Germans. He is told that the Nazis were clearly aware of the strategic importance of the uranium supplies, providing as evidence the Czech action in cutting off shipments to anyone but Germany. Einstein agrees to send a personal letter the Belgian Ambassador, and requests that Szilard write it. (fn12) 

Sachs, however, wants a slightly message to go directly to President Roosevelt. He asks to see the Szilard. Sachs tells the manic scientist that he needs a letter that he can bring to Roosevelt from Einstein. Sachs proposes that the draft of the short letter written for the Belgian ambassador be expanded to include explicit language about the possibility of the bomb and its great destructive power; Sachs virtually dictates these paragraphs, as Szilard takes notes. (fn13) 

On Saturday July 30, 1939, Teller drives Szilard to see Einstein on Long Island. He emphasizes that Roosevelt must be made aware of the Nazi bomb threat and that, he, Einstein must do this. Einstein is at first reluctant to go along, stating that he isn’t so sure about the need for the bomb, or even whether it ever could be built by the Nazis or anyone. Szilard plays on Einstein’s tremendous sense of guilt over his abandoning European Jewry to the Nazi beast. Finally, Einstein agrees—but only if there is no advocacy of the use of this potential weapon. 

The final draft is typed on Einstein’s typewriter and dated Aug. 2, 1939, and signed by Einstein. It is an act, that, in the moments after the announcement that the first atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima, that the great scientist, called the worst thing he had ever done and something he would regret until the end of his days. (fn14) 

The Einstein letter is never mailed—it is hand delivered by Szilard to Sachs in the latter’s New York office in mid-August. (fn15) 

Sachs composes a letter of his own, referring to the Einstein letter, but also referring to points he gleaned from the Szilard memorandum and from various discussions with other scientists. 

Sachs finally makes an appointment to see the President on Oct. 11. When he arrives, he finds FDR distracted with reports about developments in Europe, according to Burns. I have a matter that is most urgent to our national defense and security to bring up with you, Sachs tells FDR. It was this stress on the question of “national defense and security”—a matter “most urgent”—that been lacking in the scientists’ drafts. 

Sachs looks up at FDR and is greeted with a quizzical look from the President. He doesn’t get it, Sachs says to himself. He won’t press further now and tells FDR that he will come back in the morning when the President is less tired. 

The next morning, Sachs focuses solely on the Nazi bomb threat. He concludes his presentation with an historical analogy. Sachs tells the President that Fulton had gone to Napoleon, offering him his invention—a steam powered boat. He explained that this would change war for all time. But Napoleon didn’t get it. England, said Sachs, was saved by the “great Napoleon” failing to grasp the significance of a new idea and its military potential. (fn16) 

Suddenly, FDR turns his gaze directly on Sachs. “Alex, what you are trying to tell me is that we should prevent the Nazis from blowing us all up.” Sachs nods. He hands FDR his packet of information—his (Sachs’ letter) on top, followed by Szilard’s memo, and then finally the Einstein letter, accompanied by the some articles on fission from scientific journals. 

Einstein Letter  Aug. 2, 1939. (Page 8)

The United States has only very poor ores of uranium in miserable quantities. There is some good ore in Canada and the former Czechoslovakia, while the most important source is Belgium Congo.

In view of this situation, you may think it desirable to have some permanent contact maintained between the administration and the group of physicists working on chain reactions in America. One possible way of achieving this if for you to entrust with this task a person who has your confidence and who could perhaps serve in an inofficial capacity. His task might comprise the following:

a) to approach Government Departments, keep them informed of the further development, and put forward recommendations for Government action, giving particular attention to the problem of securing a supply of uranium ore for the United States;

b) to speed up the experimental work, which is at present being carried on within the limits of the budgets of University laboratories, by providing funds, if such funds be required, through his contacts with private persons who are willing to make contributions to this cause, and perhaps also by obtaining the co-operation of industrial laboratories which have the necessary equipment.

I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from the Czechoslovakian mines which she has taken over. That she should have taken such early action might perhaps be understood on the ground that the son of the German Under-Secretary of State, von Weizäcker, is attached to the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut in Berlin where some of the American work on uranium is being repeated.

Yours very truly,

SIGNED

[Albert Einstein]

Roosevelt summons his chief aide, Gen. “Pa” Watson. “Pa, this requires action,” the President says, handing Watson the packet he had just been given, without looking at it. Two days later, “Pa” Watson, on FDR’s behalf, sends a brief “thank you” note to Einstein, typical of the President’s courteous manner, which note is in a file in the FDR library, under the name “Sachs,” and containing the other documents as well. Even more importantly, FDR tells his aide Watson that he wants Sachs to “stay on top” of the scientists. Sachs mission has been a total success. 

And so, the American atomic bomb project is born. 

Act II

The Creation of a Nightmare

Scene 1—The Ball Gets Rolling

As a result of the meeting with Sachs, the President authorizes two actions: 

1. A committee is established to examine uranium resources and supply, and suggest measures to secure that supply from the Nazis; it had members of the ordinance departments of both the Army and Navy, with the director of the National Bureau of Standards, Lyman Briggs as chairman; 

2. A committee of scientists is set up that will discuss fission research, and its implications. The committee is made up of the “Hungarian Conspiracy” members, with Szilard playing a leading role, along with Wigner and physicists and researchers such as Hans Bethe and Enrico Fermi; Ed Teller comes on board a bit later. 

Sachs, although he has no real scientific expertise, is made a special Presidential liaison to both committees. 

Today, it is known that estimates of the German program were greatly exaggerated. In simply a technical sense, various sources have estimated that the German program, during this period 1939–40, was two years or more behind the “official” estimates delivered the President. (fn17) 

As a member of the “uranium committee,” Sachs, according to a New York Times magazine article in 1945, has access to information on the world uranium supply developed from many sources, which he provides to the cartel of private investment bankers, including the shadowy European networks that control the Belgian mining conglomerate, Union Miniere, and his own circles on Wall Street among Jacob Schiff’s collaborators. As a result of his “insider” information, he is able to guarantee that the bankers’ cartel will put a “lock” the world uranium supply (outside of Russia). 

Scene 2—New Players on the Stage 

In June 1940, with the fall of France, Roosevelt establishes the National Defense Research Committee, which includes James Conant of Harvard and Karl Compton of MIT. FDR now makes the decision to fund fission research with significant government funds. 

In an effort to build a unified government for a U.S. war effort against the Nazi threat, FDR brings into his government of his “Tory” enemies, including Hoover’s Secretary of State and the founder of the Council on Foreign Relations, Henry Stimson in as Secretary of War; he Stimson is immediately briefed on the Nazi bomb project and the U.S. response. 

At some point in 1940, FDR brings his then-Vice Presidential candidate and Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace into his office and tells him of the atomic bomb; he asks Wallace to stay on top of the discussions and keep him briefed on their progress. 

Meanwhile, across the ocean, there is a change in the British government. The new Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, is to become a major actor in the push for both the development and use of the bomb. Churchill, who reportedly briefed the President on the larger threat represented by the Synarchists behind the Nazis, is told by British intelligence of the threat of a “Nazi A-bomb;” he immediately authorizes a secret British program, in parallel to what the Americans are doing. 

Churchill has no use for the American President; but he needs FDR to “save the neck” of the British Empire from the Synarchist threat. Knowing that the British lack the ability to build the atomic terror weapon, Churchill wants the U.S. to build and use it to create a new Anglo-American imperium that will rule the world; while Roosevelt does not share these views, Churchill believes that he can manipulate events to bring his scheme to fruition. (fn18) 

Scene 3—Moving Ahead with Caution 

In early October 1940, Vannevar Bush, the director of Office of Scientific Research and Development and a member of Conant’s special committee, briefs FDR and Wallace that the British believe that a bomb can be developed from U-235, an isotope that had been produced in a diffusion plant. Bush says that the consensus within the U.S. effort is that the British are right.

But Roosevelt remains reluctant to authorize the bomb project. For almost 2 years more, FDR delays any decision, despite prodding and increasingly strident demands from Churchill, Sachs and others. (fn19) 

According to official records of a June 1942 meeting at FDR’s home in Hyde Park, Roosevelt tells the British Prime Minister that he has basically reached a decision to proceed with a crash program to build the bomb; the U.S. will assume full responsibility for its development. For the first time, he reportedly discusses its potential use in the war, stating that he will make the sole decision on such questions when it becomes appropriate. The bomb project is given a new code name: TUBE ALLOYS. 

FDR now orders the Army to undertake the development of an atomic bomb. In August, a new “top secret” district is created within the Army Corps of Engineers to direct the construction needed facilities. It is named the “Manhattan Engineering District.” 

Scene 4—A Rendezvous in Stockholm 

In October 1941, a meeting takes place in Stockholm, Sweden Niels Bohr and his wife meet in secret with their old friend and colleague Prof. Werner Heisenberg, who briefs Bohr on the Nazi program in which he plays an important role. Bohr questions how his friend could work for Hitler and the Nazis. Heisenberg replies that he believes that the scientists on the project will never allow Hitler to have a bomb. Heisenberg returns to Berlin where is he is questioned by the Gestapo; he tells them that he has met with Bohr to see what the Americans are doing on the bomb. They aren’t doing much, he says. (fn20) 

Bohr is convinced that there will never be a Nazi “bomb.” His meeting has been noted FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who is convinced that Bohr might be a spy, perhaps for the Nazis, but more likely for the Russians. He places Bohr on a special “watch list.” 

Roosevelt remains reluctant to share the bomb research with the Brits, and this makes Churchill furious. FDR tells his Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace that he fears that Churchill wants the bomb for use against the Russians, after the war. While he knows that he cannot ultimately deny the British the information, FDR decides to dither and delay the sharing, in fact, while verbally agreeing to Churchill’s demands. 

Meanwhile, against the wishes of Henry Stimson, Secretary of War and others, and directly contrary to what he has told Churchill about agreeing to keep the bomb project secret, FDR decides to allow Harry Hopkins, Secretary of Commerce and his most trusted aide, to discreetly inform the Russians of its existence. (fn21) 

The secrecy around what is now known as the Manhattan Project is enormous. What are “exceptional security arrangements,” are in effect for a labor force that would swell to 150,000; few knew the real purpose of their work. Only at Los Alamos, the main science laboratory for the project, is this code of secrecy broken. There, scientists must be allowed freedom to talk to each other and exchange ideas or no real progress could be made. But even there, the scientists believe that every move is watched over by federal agents—and it is. 

There is much chatter as well about the “rival” German program. By 1943, many of the scientists share Bohr’s view that the Germans will never get the bomb. Since the Japanese have no such project, there is now a question as to whether a bomb needs to be built at all and, if it is built ,whether it should ever be used. 

Scene 5—Bohr’s Failed Mission 

Danish physicist Bohr, while his nuclear physics has been inferior and often wrong, he has never been as hysterical about the German bomb threat as his “Hungarian Conspiracy” counterparts. He has attempted to communicate to FDR in long memoranda his assessments of the German project and the American effort. By the spring of 1944, Bohr has become alarmed at the push for the bomb and the secrecy that surrounds the project. He is concerned about “building trust” with the Russians, and fears an atomic arms race that will leave the world living in nuclear terror. Bohr, though infected with certain utopian “world government” beliefs, wants to realize the great potential benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear power. (fn22) 

Bohr comes up with a proposal: Before the bomb is used, and before that decision is even made, the U.S. should propose to Britain and Russia the establishment of mechanisms for international control and inspection of atomic energy, to build a world based on “cooperation,” not conflict. Russia must be approached as soon as possible to create mutual trust. 

The Danish scientist takes it upon himself to lobby support for his plan. Ultimately, through Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter, he gets his message to FDR, who proposes that Bohr go see Churchill to explain his concerns, hoping that this will buy Roosevelt some time to come up with a means to stymie his British ally in their push to deploy an atomic weapon. 

While in London, Bohr receives an invitation from an old Russian friend, Peter Kapitza, who is working on the Russian project, under the direction of the great V.I. Vernadsky. He is told that the Russians would make everything available for “his scientific work,” which Bohr takes to mean that they want him to work on their bomb project. He declines the offer. Bohr is watched by British intelligence, and the information is passed on to Churchill. (fn23) 

Bohr is coldly greeted by Churchill, who sends him away without really hearing his proposal. The scientist returns to the U.S. and asks to see FDR, and this time a meeting is arranged. At their August meeting, Roosevelt is warm and friendly, appearing to take Bohr into his confidence. Roosevelt agrees with Bohr’s assessments that the Nazi bomb was not really a possibility, provided the invasion of Europe goes as he expects it would. He tells the scientist that he wants the whole world to collaborate on the peaceful development of atomic power. It is through cooperation, he says, that we can make sure that the bomb doesn’t produce the nightmare that Bohr envisions. I see no reason not to approach Marshall Stalin, no matter what Winston believes, FDR says. (fn24) 

Bohr is elated. Roosevelt understands both the danger and the promise of atomic energy. But Bohr has made a serious mistake. For one reason or another, he has not disclosed his message from the Russians in London. The word starts circulating through the Anglo-American intelligence machine the Bohr is leaking information to the Russians. 

Scene 8—The President’s Health 

We must now do a bit of a time-reversal. We go back to March 27, 1944, when Roosevelt, at the inducement of several people close to him concerned about recent health problems and fatigue, goes to  the Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland for a medical check-up. In the check-up administered by a young Navy cardiologist Lt. Commander Howard Bruenn. FDR is his normal cheerful self, joking with patients and nurses, and putting the young doctor at ease. Bruenn is shocked by what he finds—his patient is suffering from serious and advanced heart disease, with signs of previous cardiac failure. FDR’s condition is serious, and requires immediate treatment, lest there be a fatal incident. (fn25) 

But FDR is no normal patient: He is the President of the United States. And although a treatment regimen is prescribed, including digitalis, the patient is not given the normal treatments for someone with advanced heart disease. Nor is he ever told the full extent of his illness. It is probable that he guessed some of what is wrong. But FDR believes that he is soldier fighting a necessary battle for his country and civilization and he is willing to put his life on the line for his cause. 

For the sake of our story, it were important to understand that FDR never doubts that he will be the man who will make the decisions about the use of the atomic bomb and the immediate post-war arrangements about nuclear power. While often physically strained and increasingly weak, he was in full command of his faculties. Had he seen the potential nearness of his demise, he might have acted differently, for example, in the case of Vice President Henry Wallace, and his place on the 1944 ticket. (fn26)

But FDR’s hubris and willpower would allow for no such doubts; the very qualities that made him a great leader, in this case, play an important role in the unfolding tragedy we report here. 

Churchill, through British intelligence sources, knows of the Bruenn examination and its conclusions. He is likely told by British doctors that Roosevelt is going to die, most likely within the next 24 months, possibly sooner. 

Churchill realizes that no successor to FDR would dare go against the President’s intentions on the atomic bomb. He decides on a gamble: He will bet that FDR will die before the bomb decision is made; before that event, Churchill will obtain a vague agreement on the bomb’s possible use against an already increasingly prostrate Japan, hoping that the President will offer this to him if he demands that it must be used. Once FDR is gone, Churchill can interpret this piece of paper as authorizing the bomb’s use. 

Scene 9—The ‘Bomb’ Memorandum 

There are no “official” records of what took place at the September 1944 Hyde Park summit between FDR and Churchill. But from various “unofficial sources,” a picture emerges. (fn 27) Churchill has come with certain “information.” He tells FDR that he believes that “your friend” Bohr is leaking material to the Soviets. He presents him with reports on the message from the Russians to Bohr asking him to join “their team.” Roosevelt didn’t believe that Bohr was a Soviet agent, but having been confronted with Churchill’s allegations, he cannot afford to associate himself with Bohr or his ideas. 

Churchill then presents a draft of a memorandum that incorporates the core of his strategy on the bomb. 

The following is a partial text of the Aide-Mémoir marked TOP SECRET, issued Sept. 19, 1944 over the initials of Roosevelt and Churchill: 

“1. The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding TUBE ALLOYS, with a view toward international agreement regarding its control and use, is not accepted. The matter should continue to be regarded with utmost secrecy, but when the ‘bomb’ is finally available, it might, perhaps, after mature consideration be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender. 

“2. Full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing TUBE ALLOYS for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan, unless and until terminated by joint agreement. 

“3. Enquiries should be made regarding the activities of Professor Bohr and steps taken to ensure that he is responsible for no leakage of information, particularly to the Russians.”

Churchill believes that he has gotten everything he wanted. 

Roosevelt also believes that he has what he wants. He substitutes for Churchill’s demand for an explicit commitment to use the bomb if military matters might dictate, the conditional agreement, including wording that says that any decision will be taken after “mature considerations.” Had FDR lived to make such “mature considerations,” no bombs would be dropped. But with FDR out of the picture, Churchill will not allow mere nominalisms to stand in his way. 

Scene 8—‘As Long As I am Around....’

The memo is discussed by the TOP Committee. Stimson in particular seems happy with what has happened. He has some vague idea that the bomb might be used only as a threat to force compliance by the Soviets to the international system, bring them into the Great Game under acceptable rules of conduct; on the issue of whether the bomb should actually be used against Japan, he is hesitant and uncertain. (fn28) 

In late August, Stimson goes to see the President to convince him of the need to understand how the bomb (his code name for it “S-1’)’ could be used to create a “new world order.” His notes for the meeting, available from the Stimson archives, read: 

“The necessity of bringing the Russian orgn. into the fold of Christian civilization.... 

“The possible use of S-1 to accomplish this... 

“Steps toward disarmament 

“Impossibility of disclosure—(S-1) 

“Science is making the common yardstick impossible.” 

Henry Wallace is upset with what he sees in the Hyde Park memo and in Stimson’s ideas of a “new order.” Wallace, dumped from the ticket in favor of Truman, is still FDR’s trusted aide on these matters. He participates in all TOP committee meetings, and FDR has informed him that he will be made Secretary of Commerce in the next Administration, from where, among other things he intends Wallace to oversee the peaceful development of atomic power. 

Wallace goes to see the President, according to an article he wrote later. He asks whether the memo means a change in his policy—is he going to drop a bomb? Roosevelt says nothing has changed. FDR explains that the memo keeps Churchill off his back. As long as I am around, we will do the right thing, he says. (fn29) 

The President looks tired and gaunt in these last days of the 1944 Presidential campaign, even before his grueling Yalta trip, that is to come with the New Year. 

Scene 9—The Backchannel 

Roosevelt has another thing up his sleeve, something that even Wallace doesn’t know about. The war in Europe is almost over. That will mean that attention will turn to the war in the Pacific and the defeat of Japan. While the Joint Chiefs are busy formulating a battle plan for the invasion of the Japanese home islands, FDR believes that such an invasion may not be necessary, that Japan can be induced to surrender, without use of the bomb. 

Back in 1941, Roosevelt had attempted to work a backchannel directly into the Japanese royal family to reach some kind of agreement to avoid war. It had been sabotaged through the work of networks associated with the Synarchist John Foster Dulles and British networks inside and outside Japan, who desired the Pearl Harbor attack and America’s entry into the war. FDR believes that while a militarist-Synarchist faction controls the government, Emperor Hirohito has been a reluctant warrior. Roosevelt thinks that a new backchannel is possible by which he can work out a peace plan directly with the Emperor, if necessary. He asks his trusted intelligence operatives, such as Office of Strategic Services Director William Donovan to keep their eyes and ears open for a possible “backchannel” from the Emperor or his networks. (fn30)

Meanwhile, dissent mounts among scientists working on the bomb project. Alexander Sachs now re-emerges as the “voice” of this “dissident,” and goes to see the President in December. Roosevelt tells him that, if a bomb is developed, there should be a non-military demonstration, observed by clergymen and international scientists, and perhaps even representatives of the Japanese government. After that, if the use of the bomb were deemed militarily necessary, an explicit and direct warning would be made indentifying the time and target of the nuclear attack, to allow for orderly civilian evacuation. The target should be of military value. Sachs does not report this discussion until long after FDR is dead and the bomb dropped. (fn31) 

Some time in early 1945, the backchannel that FDR had expected opens up. Eventually, this develops into discussions in Rome and the Holy See, through the office of the Vatican’s Secretary of State and various OSS operatives. As the discussions, code named “VESSEL,” progress, it becomes clear that the Emperor will pursue peace, but needs an assurance that the Imperial family will be left in power in whatever government is formed, to give him clout. (fn32)

Scene 12—The Light Goes Out

For Franklin Roosevelt, time is running out. 

In early 1945, Roosevelt tells the Joint Chiefs that he intends to delay any decision on an invasion of Japan until at least the Fall of 1945. In Europe,  Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe concurs. In the Pacific, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, whom FDR despises as a political thinker but respects as a military genius, thinks the plan for the Japanese invasion is a waste of manpower and money; Japan is no longer a threat to anyone, but itself. Wait them out, until a surrender can be arranged. 

Some time in March 1945, OSS Chief Donovan goes in to see the President to brief him. He emerges from the Oval Office shaken. The President is wasting away. He is gone, he tells an aide, with a sense of foreboding. (fn33) 

Bohr, who has been in Europe much of the time since the Sept. 19, 1944 memo, comes back to the U.S., in early April. He has heard that Churchill believes that he can force the U.S. to use the bomb, and that its main target will not be Japan, but the Soviet Union. This is called “terror politics,” and Bohr stays up several nights writing a special memorandum for FDR. In it, he argues for openness and for collaboration with the Russians, and against secrecy and distrust, lest the world live in an era of “atomic terror.” Bohr seeks out Justice Frankfurter to help him get the memo to Roosevelt. He proposes to meet with the British Ambassador, the Synarchist Lord Halifax, who represents himself as an opponent of Churchill, to discuss the matter. The meeting is set for Rock Creek Park in Washington for the late afternoon of April 12. (fn34) 

On April 11, FDR drafts a speech for coming Jefferson Day events. He is in Warm Springs, Georgia, away from Washington for some rest and relaxation. It seems to be having a wonderful effect, reinvigorating him. He is full of hope and optimism. In the draft, after paying tribute to Jefferson as a Secretary of State, President, and scientist, he turns to the world situation: 

“The once powerful, malignant Nazi state is crumbling. The Japanese war lords are receiving in their own homeland, the retribution for which they asked when they attacked Pearl Harbor. 

“But the mere conquest of our enemies is not enough. 

“We must go on to do all in our power to conquer, the doubts and fears, the ignorance and greed, which made this horror possible.... 

“Today, we are faced with the preeminent fact that, if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships—the ability of all peoples, of all kinds to live together and to work together, in the same world, at peace…. 

“The work, my friends, is peace. More than an end of this war—an end to the beginnings of all wars. Yes, an end, forever, to this impractical, unrealistic settlement of differences between governments by the mass killing of peoples…. 

“The only limits to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith.”

At a little after 1:00 p.m. on April 12, FDR suffers a massive cerebral hemorrhage. Not long after, that the First Soldier in mankind’s struggle against the darkness of evil is dead. He had told Henry Wallace that he would be there to make the fateful decisions about the bomb; now those decisions will be made by Harry S Truman, whom Roosevelt hasn’t even briefed on the bomb project. 

Act III

The Dropping of the Bomb

Scene I—The Little Man Who Is President 

Harry S Truman, a mean little man of limited intelligence, is now the President of the United States. One day after FDR’s death, Stimson goes to see him. Truman has not been a participant in the TOP committee; Wallace has continued to serve there, at FDR’s insistence. Stimson, now lets Truman fully in on the bomb project; he tells him that by the best estimates, a bomb will be ready for use by mid-Summer. 

Truman is shocked by what he hears. However, he quickly becomes excited with the prospects for the “super-weapon.” Was Roosevelt planning to drop the bomb on Japan, Truman asks. Stimson tells the new President that FDR was prepared to use it on Japan, and hands him a copy of the Sept. 19 memo with Churchill as his “proof.” Then, I am prepared to use it, as well, Truman blusters. He is to never waiver from this initial determination to use the bomb. (fn35) 

On that same day, Truman receives a top secret briefing paper prepared by Secretary of State Edward Stettinius that purports to describe U.S. foreign policy. (fn36) Stettinius had never really shared FDR’s views on the prospects for post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union. In two areas in particular, this difference is crucial: It does not mention Roosevelt’s clearly stated intent to use American power to end colonial empires; it exaggerates FDR’s concerns about problems with the Soviets. Churchill reinforces this briefing in his first communications with the new President. 

Such briefings reinforce Truman’s own Hobbesian views of foreign policy and basic distrust and fear of foreigners. While he soon tells the nation that he intends to “continue [FDR’s] policies,” Truman intends to put his own stamp on these policies. He will be pragmatic, tough, and forceful, where FDR was a dreamer and idealist. 

When Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov stops in Washington for a “courtesy visit” with the new American President, he is greeted with a harangue, which includes cuss words, about how the Russians have broken the Yalta agreements, especially on Poland, and have betrayed the trust of the late President and the hope of the world. Molotov, shocked by the little President’s outburst in such in undiplomatic terms, says, “I have never been spoken to like that in my life.” Truman sternly replies, “Carry out your agreements and you won’t get talked to like that!” 

A stunned Molotov leaves Washington. He had been sent by Stalin to the San Francisco conference to draft and approve the UN Charter as a sign of Russian commitment to the late President’s dream. He now cables Stalin that Truman is a “madman.” (fn37) 

Scene 2—The Puppetmaster 

One man is pleased by the new President’s behavior—James “Jimmy” Byrnes, the former Justice of the Supreme Court and South Carolina Senator, who is to become Truman’s Rasputin on foreign policy and his Secretary of State. FDR had used Byrnes’ organizational skills in heading the War Mobilization Board, but he knew that the South Carolinian’s view of the world was that of an American imperialist, the flip side of Churchill’s views. The ambitious Byrnes believed that he, not Truman, should have been sitting in White House. (fn38) 

Truman knew Byrnes in the Congress, and feels at ease with the bourbon and scotch drinking Southerner, a fellow poker player. Byrnes makes Truman dependent on him; if he cannot be President, then the President will be his puppet. He moulds Truman’s vague Hobbesian worldview into a virulent anti-Communist, neo-imperialism with a utopian flair. 

In briefing Truman on the bomb, Stimson had proposed the creation of a new secret “Interim Committee.” Perhaps fearing what he sees as the unstable qualities of new President, and the growing influence of Byrnes, he proposes that this new committee make a recommendation on the testing and use of the bomb. Truman immediately agrees, and Stimson draws up a list of participants. Stimson will be its chairman. However, Truman appoints Jimmy Byrnes as his special and personal representative to the Committee. Byrnes, not Stimson, becomes the person who briefs the President on its deliberations. (fn39) 

The first meeting of this new so-called Interim Committee in late April, 1945 hears reports on the awesome power of the bomb. Byrnes asks whether there is any possible defense against this weapon. He is told there isn’t, that in the future, only ever-larger and more powerful bombs will be built. Then, the only defense against further development is to kill all the scientists? Byrnes asks. 

Byrnes asks both the Committee members and the various engineers and others interviewed how long it would take before the Russians might develop an atomic weapon. Based on the information that he is given, he concludes that it would “take seven to ten years, at least...” He believes this estimate to be “optimistic.” 

On July 1, at a secret session of the Committee, the decision is made to unanimously recommend that the bomb be used as soon as it is ready against Japan. Byrnes reports that the only caveat in its use should be that a site be selected of some “military value,” either war production plants or port facilities or military bases be in the general area. Wanting to give the Japanese no excuse to surrender and thus avoid the bomb’s use, Byrnes argues against advance warning, claiming that if warning were given, the Japanese might bring U.S. POWs to the bomb target area. (fn40) 

Byrnes is sworn in as the new Secretary of State on July 3. He now controls all decisions about the potential surrender terms with the Japanese, and can make it impossible for them to surrender without suffering an atomic bombing. (fn41) 

Scene 3—The Puppet Is Manipulated 

Byrnes briefs the President on the Committee’s recommendation. Truman, realizing that he is now being asked for a decision on the bomb, becomes nervous. Explain to me what the military implication of all this is, he asks.. Byrnes starts by telling the President of the Joint Chief’s battle plan which called for an invasion of the Japanese home islands in November, starting with Kyoshu, and then followed in the Spring of 1946, by an invasion of main island of Honshu. Five million allied troops, mostly Americans, would be facing 5 million fanatical Japanese willing to die to defend their homeland and the Emperor; there would be probably upwards of 1 million casualties, mostly American, and millions of Japanese dead. 

So, you are telling me that using this weapon will save a million American lives and more than that in Japs? Truman asked, as he paces about nervously. Finally he turns to Byrnes, Well Jimmy, there’s no choice is there. Tell them I agree with their recommendation. (fn42) 

A Presidential order is issued directing that the bomb be tested, and if successful, that it should be used on a target selected by the Committee. 

In the late Spring 1945, Leo Szilard, who at this moment is as obsessed with not using the bomb as he is to later become obsessed with its pre-emptive use against the Soviets, approaches Byrnes to plead his case, which is supported by a large number of top physicists who worked on the Manhattan Project. Byrnes rejects their plea for a “demonstration test,” tells Szilard that the biggest benefit would not be on Japan or the Pacific War. The bomb would be used, Byrnes says, for another purpose—“to make Russia more manageable in Europe.” (fn43) 

Scene 4—’Hamlet’ Is Gripped by Doubt 

As Secretary Stimson sits through the Interim Committee meetings, he becomes increasingly uneasy. He is now 77 years old, part of the “old guard,” the founder of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the leader of the “Eastern Establishment.” He never liked Roosevelt, and suffered him as a necessary annoyance in gaining a victory against the synarchist fascists. Now, he worries about this new breed of utopians and their view of the power of the “bomb.” It is one thing to have it as a threat, to be used within the old balance of power system. It is another to use it with a blindness about your adversaries—you might trigger a war that will end civilization, and the power of the “Establishment” with it. 

Stimson is no “humanitarian” and has little concern for the lives of “little people,” be they Japanese or Americans. It is political pragmatism and fear of utopians like Byrnes that motivates him to press for giving the Japanese a real chance to surrender before the utopians drop the bomb. He drafts a proclamation to be issued by the U.S. and Britain at the July Three-Power conference, scheduled for July 17 to August 2 in Potsdam, Germany. Aware of the past backchannel negotiations, he comes up with language that threatens Japan with the “utter destruction of its homeland” if it doesn’t surrender, but includes an offer to continue “... a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty ...” if it does. (fn44) 

Stimson now appeals to this little man from Missouri whom fate and poor judgment has made President, going to him with the draft his staff has prepared for the Potsdam declaration on Japan. But the President turns these matters over to his Secretary of State. Byrnes reviews the Stimson draft, accepting its basic wording, but striking its most important passage—the offer to continue the Imperial dynasty. (fn45) 

Scene 5—The Emperor Makes a Move 

In Japan, on the eve of Potsdam. Emperor Hirohito is becoming anxious. The backchannel through the Vatican has yielded no result; with FDR’s death, there is no one to talk to. The Emperor seeing the needless slaughter, decides to make a new overture through the Russians, hoping that they might broker a peace deal. (fn46) 

On July 12, Hirohito goes to see his former Prime Minister, Prince FumimaroKonoe, who is now in semi-retirement. An opponent of the war with the U.S., he had left the government after being blocked in an earlier effort to secure peace prior to Pearl Harbor through direct negotiations between FDR and the Emperor. Hirohito goes alone, in violation of all royal protocol. He asks Konoe for advice. “It is necessary to end this war as soon as possible,” the Prince replies. The Emperor orders him to prepare for a trip to Moscow. 

The Japanese Foreign Minister cables Japanese Ambassador Sato in Moscow on July 13:

“His Majesty is extremely anxious to terminate the war as soon as possible, being deeply concerned that any further continuation of hostilities will only aggravate untold miseries of the millions upon millions of innocent men and women in the countries at war. If, however, the United States and Great Britain should insist on unconditional surrender, Japan would be forced to fight to the bitter end.”

The Ambassador is informed that the Emperor will dispatch Prince Konoe to Moscow to speak with the Soviet government. 

Hirohito unfortunately miscalculates the “good services” of the Soviet government, which is preparing to declare war on Japan—as agreed to in the Yalta accords. Stalin is committed to Russia becoming a “player” in the Asian theatre. The continuation of the war, even for a short period of time, is in Russia’s interests. 

The Japanese message is intercepted and decoded by American intelligence. It is passed on to Truman, already en route by sea to Potsdam, Byrnes tells Truman to ignore this Japanese “trick.” Truman, in the thrall of his Rasputin, dismisses the idea of any negotiated settlement with the Emperor before the bomb is used. (fn47) 

Scene 6—The Bomb Works 

On July 16, the world’s first atomic bomb is exploded over the sands of the New Mexico desert, as Truman and Churchill meet in Potsdam. Meanwhile, a cruiser leaves San Francisco en route to Tinian Island; it carries one of two atomic bombs to be dropped on Japan. 

In Potsdam that same morning, at the dawn of the atomic age, the Joint Chiefs meet with Stimson. According to the logs of the meeting, the discussion centers on the final phases of the war and the bomb. General George Marshall, who later regretted that he had not been more forceful on the matter, expresses his fear that the world will not forgive the United States if Japan is not given a real chance to surrender before the bomb might be used. Admiral Ernest King says that there is no need for this weapon; it has no military value, because Japan can be brought to its knees by a blockade. General Henry “Hap” Arnold of the Army Air Forces argues that conventional bombing could end the war. Admiral William Leahy, who had called the bomb project a great and tragic folly, is at a loss to explain why “civilians” seem so determined to use this weapon. 

Stimson listens. He is aware of Emperor Hirohito’s new peace initiative. He listens, but says nothing as the meeting breaks up. 

On his return for a brief tour of Berlin, a glum-faced Stimson greets the President. He has in his hand a cable from his Special Consultant George Harrison, who serves as a liaison with the bomb project. It is written in code, and talks about an “operation” that apparently was a “success.” At first Truman is confused. It’s the bomb, Stimson whispers in his ear. Suddenly Truman becomes highly excited, brimming from ear-to-ear, exclaims: “The war is over!” (fn48) 

The next morning, Stimson goes to see Byrnes with the news of the bomb test. He pleads with Byrnes for a two-part initiative: Give the Japanese a direct warning about the bomb, as explicit as possible; and, assure them that the U.S. will allow Japan to keep its Emperor. Byrnes rejects both proposals. 

At lunchtime, Stimson walked the cable over to Churchill. The Prime Minister offered his congratulations, but said little else, according to Mee. 

As Churchill, Stalin, and Truman meet in Potsdam, and then hold a brief reception, Stimson receives the follow-on cable from Harrison in Washington: Gen. Leslie Groves (the General in charge of the Manhattan Project) reports that the bomb had exceeded all expectations. When Truman hears to the news, he boasts that the U.S. now possesses the most powerful weapon in human history. 

Scene 7—The War Is Over—The War Must Go On 

The next day, July 18, Truman lunches with Churchill. He is alone—Byrnes is not with him, and he clutches the two cables on the bomb in his hand. According to the official notes on the meeting, Truman hands them to the Prime Minister who greets the “news” with far greater enthusiasm than he had shown to Stimson. This is “world-shaking news,” he beams and the two stand there gleeful about the savage potential of a weapon. 

Truman believes that Stalin needs to be told “something.” He suggests that it be done casually “after one of our meetings that we have an entirely novel form of bomb, something quite out of the ordinary, which we think will have a decisive effect on the Japanese will to continue the war.” Churchill concurs. (fn49) 

Churchill is now certain that Truman will drop the bomb and is now free to do something to clear his name of this crime in future history books. He informs Truman that Stalin has discussed with him the Moscow peace feeler, coming directly from the Japanese Emperor. “Japan would not accept ‘unconditional surrender,’ but might be prepared to compromise on other terms,” he says. To not accept this and prolonging the war means greater loss of life to Americans and to a lesser extent the British, and also to the Japanese. Might it not be possible to alter our wording to provide the Japanese with the assurances that they need, that they could surrender with “honor.” 

Churchill knows that this will provoke rage from the little President. Pearl Harbor proves that the Japanese do not have nor do they deserve to be treated with honor, Truman shoots back: I am tired of this whining about the terms of surrender; it is “unconditional surrender,” period. The “official” history, as recorded in the records of the Potsdam Conference, will now show that the Beast-Man Churchill is not to blame for the decision to drop the bomb—which he has encouraged all along; it is the Americans, who have ignored Churchill’s “wise counsel.” (fn50) 

Scene 8—Stimson Goes with the Flow 

Henry “Hamlet” Stimson awaits the full report from Gen. Groves. He knows what it will say. He knows what the reaction of the other players in our tragedy—Truman, Byrnes, and Churchill—will be to it. 

Another man, a more courageous soul, would have thought of some way to “flank” the utopian “atomic bombers.” Frightened by such thoughts, this personification of the “Establishment” decides to “go with the flow,” to rationalize his own defeat, and take sides with the winners. His thoughts turn to how the bomb can be used to change the character and thinking of the Russian government. 

Finally, the Groves report comes: The bomb is devastatingly effective as a weapon and massively destructive. At 3:30 p.m., Stimson takes the report to the President, who sits in discussion with Byrnes. The two read it, growing wildly exuberant, as they proceed. They shake each others hand. In their glee, they shake Stimson’s hand. The President thanks him for bringing him this information, for serving these long months in coordinating the bomb project. Stimson doesn’t know it, but he has been given the “kiss-off.” Byrnes in particular doesn’t want any “waverers” around. 

Scene 9—A World Transformed

In the plenary session of July 21, the official records show, Truman, with the bomb in his back pocket, is aggressive with Stalin to the point of being almost belligerent. 

The meeting is paradigmatic of a change taking place in the conduct of global diplomacy and relations generally. The bomb, even before it has been used, has ended FDR’s hopes for a post-war world. 

Roosevelt had believed that through cooperation one develops trust, even with a potential or actual adversary. Through trust and cooperation, over time, one actually changes the way that adversary or potential adversary sees things, and you in turn start to see things differently, from a broader and better perspective. Changing the way the Russians see the world and think about it, FDR believed, was the necessary step to creating a community of nations, with different systems of government and ethnic and religious backgrounds, but of shared common goals and principles. 

Cooperation has now been replaced by competition, and, where necessary, confrontation. Nobody changes, and foreign policy becomes a series of conflicts to be managed, rather than projects of hope to be realized. 

The utopian Byrnes believes, as does the intoxicated Truman, that the bomb holds some kind of mystical or magical power, such as that of another “super-weapon,” Excalibur, King Arthur’s sword, and that, once it is used on Japan, it will have such a magical power over the Russians. 

Scene 10—’The Second Coming in Wrath’ 

On July 22, Stimson walks the Groves report over to Churchill’s villa. Churchill is described as being “transported” by the document. “Stimson,” he booms out, waving a cigar, “what was gunpowder. Trivial! What was electricity? Meaningless! The atomic bomb is the Second Coming in Wrath!” 

The meetings continue, and Stimson sits on the outside, looking in. The Hamlet in him is at work again, as he again wavers on the bomb’s use. On the morning of July 24, he goes to see Truman, this time bearing a message from Gen. Groves that the bomb will be ready for a drop on a Japanese target at any time after Aug. 3. Truman is delighted; he will get Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek to sign on to the Potsdam proclamation, along with the U.S., Britain, and the USSR; this will serve as the ultimatum to the Japanese, after which, the bomb will be dropped. 

Stimson seizes on the mention of the Proclamation to again ask that the deleted phrase about a constitutional monarchy be reinstated. Truman winces, says he will think about it, as he ushers Stimson to the door. 

Meanwhile, Winston Churchill’s Conservative Party has been soundly trounced in a general election. He is no longer the Prime Minister, and Labor’s Clement Atlee is. Atlee knows little of the bomb, and will have no role in deciding its ultimate use. Churchill exits our stage, depressed at his electoral defeat, but happy in the knowledge that he has kept things on a path leading to the dropping of the great terror weapon—the “Second Coming in Wrath”—on Japan. He is to write in his memoirs later that the bomb was totally unnecessary for either ending or shortening the war; yet, he is also to state that its use “was never really a matter of doubt.” 

Churchill’s manic Beast-Man character is best captured by two of his top aides: 1st Viscount Alanbrooke (Alan Brooke), his foremost military advisor, who was present when Churchill had earlier briefed his generals on the American bomb, and Lord Moran, (Dr. Charles McMoran Wilson) his trusted physician. 

Brooke reports in Arthur Bryant’s Triumph in the West, 1943–1946:

“He [Churchill] had absorbed all the minor American exaggeration, and as a result, was completely carried away.... [W]e now had something in our hands which could redress the balance with the Russians.... Now we had a new valued which redressed our position (he said, pushing out his chin and scowling); now we could say, ‘If you insist on doing this or that, well... And then where are the Russians!’”

In his diary, Lord Moran reacted to Churchill’s report that the bomb was going to be dropped:

“I own [that] I was deeply shocked by the ruthless decision to use the bomb on Japan...There can be no moment in the whole war when things looked to me so black, and desperate, and the future so hopeless.... It was not so much the morality of the thing, it was simply that the lynch pin that had been underpinning the world had been half wrenched out.... I once slept in a house where there had been a murder. I feel like that here [sleeping at Churchill’s quarters at Potsdam—lsw].”

Scene 11—The Order Is Given 

Meanwhile, in Moscow the wheels of diplomacy continue to spin. At the direction of the Emperor, Shingenori Tōgō, the Minister of Foreign Affairs sends a cableto Naotake Satō , Japan’s Ambassador to the USSR. Japan, the cable says, while it cannot accept unconditional surrender,

“we should like to communicate to the other party [the United States] through appropriate channels [the Russians] that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter.... Should the United States and Great Britain remain insistent on formality, there is no solution other than for us to hold out until complete collapse because of this one point alone. Also, it is necessary to have them [the United States] understand that we are trying to end hostilities by asking for very reasonable terms in order to secure and maintain our nation’s existence and honor.”

It is now explicit: Japan is ready to surrender immediately if it is given an “honorable” way out—i.e., the monarchy is kept in place. There is no reason to drop the bomb.

The cable is intercepted and decoded by American intelligence and transmitted with highest urgency directly to Byrnes and Truman in Potsdam. Both see the message; Byrnes tells Truman that there is no need to negotiate, at all. Truman has already made his mind up—either Japan accepts the unconditional surrender of the Potsdam declaration, or they will be atomic bombed. (fn51) 

On July 25, with the knowledge of the Moscow peace feeler in his hand, Harry S Truman, the man who FDR never wanted to become President, signs the executive command that orders the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan. Attached to the draft order are one page descriptions of four possible acceptable targets—Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Kokura, and Niigata. The President, with Byrnes at his side, tells Stimson that the “order stands,” unless he hears directly from himself that the Japanese reply to the release of the warning-communiqué is acceptable. 

The decision to drop the bomb, Truman would say in a letter to his daughter Margaret, was “no great decision ... not any decision you had to worry about.” 

Scene 12—A Terror Weapon, Not a Military Weapon 

Truman in his memoirs, and Byrnes in his, claim that they never really considered the bomb as anything more than a military weapon. “I regarded the bomb as a military weapon,” writes Truman, “and never had any doubt that it should be used.” But both men were aware that the bomb was not militarily necessary; they had been told this by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The decision to use the bomb was made exactly as Lyndon LaRouche has described: Not for military purposes, but as a weapon of horrific terror, which terror could then be used to shape the post-war world—a weapon for use by “Beast-Men.” (fn52) 

On June 1, a report had been prepared for the Interim Committee at the request of Byrnes who sought a “better understanding” of how best to target the use of the bomb against Japan. The report, which has since been declassified, says that the bomb should not merely be used on a military target, but on a “dual-military civilian target”—a military installation or factory surrounded by workers and families’ homes. In that way, the bomb “will have the maximum psychological effect.” 

As Stimson and Byrnes both knew, as Truman knew, there was no need for this “terror effect” on Japan—it was already in the process of surrendering. “However,” as historian Charles Mee, Jr. observes:

“If the weapons were not dropped on Japan, the doomsday machine could have no psychological impact on Russia. The bomb was therefore dropped on Japan for the effect it had on Russia—just as Jimmy Byrnes had said. The psychological effect on Stalin was two-fold: the Americans had not only used their doomsday machine; they had used it, when as Stalin knew, it was not militarily necessary. It was this last chilling fact that doubtless made the greatest impression on the Russians.”

Scene 13—The Ultimatum 

At 7:00 p.m. on the evening of July 26, the Potsdam Declaration is issued by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and China:

“4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continued to be controlled by self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason....”

It contains the following fateful ultimatum:

“13. We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.”

The next day, July 28, the new British government, Prime Minister Clement Atlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, arrive at Potsdam. Together with Truman and Byrnes, they meet that evening with Stalin and Molotov. According to the official records of the conference, Stalin opens the discussions by stating that “I want to inform you that we have received a new proposal from Japan.” He then says that although the Americans and British have not properly consulted with him on their “initiative” to Japan [the Ultimatum—lsw], “we believe that nevertheless we should inform each other of new proposals.” Stalin then reads the cable delivered by Ambassador Satō—which both the Americans and British have already seen and have dismissed. Stalin points out that the message comes directly from the Emperor of Japan. 

If Stalin were to press his “allies” to accept or at least work with this overture, then Byrnes and Truman’s efforts to drop the bomb might be thwarted. They breathe a deep sigh of relief as Stalin says that “the document does not contain anything new” and that the Russians will reply in the “same spirit as the last time”—completely negatively. Truman states. “We do not object.” Atlee comments: “We agree.” Stalin then closes the matter—and, with it, the last real hope to avoid dropping the bomb:—“I have nothing more to add.” (fn53) 

Meanwhile in Tokyo, the Japanese cabinet is debating the Potsdam Declaration. According to Toland, citing official records, the cabinet’s war faction sees it as an ultimatum for an unacceptable “unconditional surrender,” an act that humiliates the Japanese nation, its Emperor, and all those who have died fighting for them. But, Prime Minister Shigenori Tōgō and Foreign Minister Kantaro Suzuki see a glimmer of hope in the words about not destroying the nation of Japan and that “unconditional surrender” refers only to the armed forces, and not the Emperor. The divided cabinet reaches a compromise: It will publish the Declaration, edited, without any comment. They will wait to hear from the Russians. 

The war party plants information in its allied press the proclamation is considered unacceptable and “laughable.” Suzuki holds a press conference in mid-afternoon on July 28 to clarify the government’s position. He tells the press that the government sees the proclamation as a rehash of the Cairo Declaration, and not of “great importance.” He uses the Japanese word “mokusatsu” to say how the Japanese government intends to treat it. The term was meant, Suzuki said in an interview after the war, as the equivalent of “no comment.” Instead, the U.S. State Department deliberately misinterprets it to mean “ignore” and the American press prints that the Japanese have turned down the surrender ultimatum. 

Scene 14—No Turning Back 

Events now move quickly, as our drama rushes to its now inevitable tragic conclusion, On Aug. 1, the last day of the Potsdam Conference, an urgent cable makes its way from Tokyo to Ambassador Satō in Moscow:

“Efforts will be made to gather opinions from the various quarters regarding definite terms [of surrender]. (For this it is our intention to make the Potsdam Three-Power Declaration the basis of the study regarding these terms)....”

Ambassador Satō is urged to convince the Russians to accept Prince Konoe as a special envoy from the Emperor. This cable is also intercepted, and is sent directly to Byrnes and Truman. It is ignored, as the others were ignored. Japan, clearly already defeated, and accepting defeat is about to be atomic bombed. 

Scene 15—‘The Greatest Event in History’

At 2:45 a.m in the Pacific, as Jimmy Byrnes and his puppet, President Truman, sail home on the USS Augusta from their “triumph” at Potsdam, the B-29 bomber Enola Gay takes off, headed for the military-civilian target of Hiroshima, with the atomic bomb in its bomb bay. At a little after 9:09 a.m., it arrives at the target. Six minutes later, the world’s first atomic weapon is released on the unsuspecting and mostly civilian population of Hiroshima. 100,000 people are killed instantly. Another 100,000 are to die from radiation and related causes. 

Cables cross the Pacific, then the continent to the War Department. Finally, the message confirming the bombing reaches the USS Augusta still in the Atlantic. Capt. Frank Graham, an officer in the ship’s map room, hands it to President Truman, who is dining with the crew. According to the report in the ship’s newspaper, Truman becomes highly excited, flashing his famous shit-eating grin. “This is the greatest thing in history,” the insane President proclaims. 

Another message follows quickly, this one directly from Stimson. It repeats and confirms the information in the first. 

Truman can no longer contain himself. He jumps up from his seat, and with both messages in hand, this little man strides triumphantly over to Jimmy Byrnes. Truman now asks for quiet. The crew, some of them alarmed by the President’s behavior,  stop all conversation. I have some good news to tell all of you, Truman says. I have just been informed that a powerful new bomb with an explosive force of more than 20,000 tons of TNT has been dropped on Japan. Everyone rises and there is loud and sustained applause and cheering. 

Truman, with Byrnes trailing, and still with the messages clutched in his hand, storms into the officers ward room. “Keep you seats gentleman,” he says. “We have just dropped a bomb on Japan which has more power than 20,000 tons of TNT. It was an overwhelming success. We won the gamble!” The news is greeted by cheering and applause, as the President smiles and nods, and his puppetmaster Byrnes looks on. 

Americans are hearing a pre-recorded broadcast message from the President, drafted by Byrne; it sounds like—and is—a message from a “Beast-Man:”

“[We have dropped] an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East…. If they do not accept our terms now, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this Earth.”

Truman now signs the order for a second atomic bombing using “Fat Man,” the last available bomb, the one named for Winston Churchill. 

Scene 17—The Rule of ‘Beast-Men’ 

In Japan, the Japanese cabinet remains stalemated. Something finally does come from Moscow—on Aug. 8, the Soviet Union declares war on Japan. 

That same day, the USS Augusta docks at the naval base in Norfolk, Virginia and within hours, Truman and Byrnes are back in Washington. “Hamlet” Stimson is ready for another impotent effort; he asks the President to delay the use of the next bomb to give the Japanese a chance to surrender. He suggests that maybe the hand of the Emperor should be strengthened by communicating some kind of language through informal channels about a desire to keep the Imperial family in place. The President is too far gone in his reverie of the bomb to even hear of such ideas. 

Meanwhile, in Tokyo, events are coming to a head: Prime Minister Suzuki tells the Japanese cabinet that there is now no alternative but accept the Potsdam Declaration and hope for the best terms. It is early morning, Aug. 9. According to Toland, one minute after Suzuki makes his statement, the B-29 Bock’s Car drops “Fat-Man” on the unsuspecting, mostly civilian, population of Nagasaki. The total of dead or dying and deformed this time: another 100,000, or so. 

Truman receives news of the second bombing with crazed glee of a Beast-Man. The war is over, he exclaims. The war had been over for months, but Byrnes and his puppet President had prolonged it to drop these bombs. 

There are no more bombs left. According to official documents in the Truman library, Byrnes now authorizes, and Truman approves, a communication to the Japanese about the Emperor: the Imperial family will be retained, subject to the initial command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. 

The deadlock in the Japanese cabinet continues. Debate rages on into the early morning of Aug. 10. Finally at around 3:00 a.m., the Emperor has had enough. He has been trying to end the war for almost a year, and even now he has received nothing from the atomic warriors in Washington that might help him get the job done. Emperor Hirohito announces that he has personally declared an end to the war. 

The message is communicated to Washington. Only then is the message about the Imperial family sent back to Tokyo. 

On Aug. 14, the President announces to the nation that the Japanese had accepted “unconditional surrender.” The Japanese had surrendered on terms that would have been acceptable 5 months ago or more. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese had died in that time, as well as tens of thousands of Americans and other allied forces. All so that two atomic bombs could be dropped. 

In his book, Meeting at Potsdam, conference chronicler Mees writes:

“No one likes or wants to confront the fact—but it is clear from the events and conversations during the Potsdam conference that the use of the atomic bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki was wanton murder.”

Admiral Leahy is sickened by what has happened. He concludes:

“The Americans had adopted the ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.”

For Leahy and others of compassion and sanity, America’s leadership and their Anglo co-conspirators, had become Beast-Men, comparable in their cold calculations to Hitler. These people were now poised to terrorize the world, perhaps even to launch an atomic crusade against their Soviet “allies” in the near future. 

Among the ashes and dead and dying of Hiroshima and Nagasaki lay also Franklin Roosevelt’s hopes and dreams for the peoples of the world of a bright future, based on peace and development and cooperation, now replaced by a nightmare of nuclear-doomsday terror. Our tragedy began with little steps, until those steps became a stampede down a pathway towards insanity; it continues in modified form to this day. 

As we see events unfold in Washington today, with a new band of utopian atomic warriors manipulating a stupid and inept President, let us dedicate ourselves to not repeat this tragedy. As LaRouche demands: Let us stop it now, by getting rid of our new utopian menace, Dick Cheney and his neo-con cabal, before they kill us all in their folly. It were time to end this continuing tragedy—and for the reign of Beast-Men to come to an end.

END NOTES

1. The “schoolbook” explanation for the U.S. dropping to two atomic bombs on Japan has been that it was necessary “to shorten the Pacific War,” and that it “saved a million American lives in a possible invasion of Japan.” This was the “official” explanation of the Truman government and has been dutifully repeated ever since. Of late, this view has come into question. For example, see Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (New York: Vintage, 1996).

2. See Robert L. Baker, “Henry Wallace Would Never Have Dropped the Bomb on Japan,” EIR Vol. 30, No. 43, Nov. 7, 2003, pp. 32–41.

3. For more on these factions, see Lyndon LaRouche et al, Children of Satin (LaRouche PAC, Leesburg, VA, 2004).

4. See Lyndon LaRouche et al., ibid; also Edward Spannaus, “‘Shock and Awe’: Terror Bombing from Wells and Russell to Cheney,” EIR, Vol. 30, No. 42, Oct. 31, 2003, pp. 17–33.

5. The Jewish Rescue Committee and Joint Distribution Committee helped to get many Jews out of harm’s way in Europe. Funding for their operations came from many Wall Street investment banks, and those interests provided lists of those they wanted rescued.

6. Bela Szilar, ed., Genius in the Shadows: A biography of Leo Szilard (New York: Scribners, 1992).

7. As recounted by Edward Teller in a Jan. 14, 1997 speech to an event sponsored by the American Defense Preparedness Association.

8. Sachs is typical of those powerful bankers who exert their power in subtle, if important ways. He was a representative of various oligarchical energy interests (coal, oil, and later uranium). Sources for this biographical material, as well as his role as the bomb’s “godfather,” include Geoffrey Hellman, “A Reporter at Large: The Contemporaneous Memoranda of Dr. Sachs,” The New Yorker, Dec. 1, 1945; and Burns, James MacGregor, Roosefelt: The Soldier of Freedom, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1970); a 1994 e-mail on the www.freedomdomain.com website discussing Sachs and Société Générale.

9. Schiff managed the personal accounts of King Edward VII. He is the putative author of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.

10. Lehman Bros. was typical of what FDR liked to call a “Tory” bank, from the point it was established in Montgomery, Alabama in the 1850s, and served British agent and New York banker August Belmont, as a funding conduit for the British-sponsored Confederate insurrection.

11. In reality, Sachs was merely an acquaintance of FDR, to whom FDR was courteous, as much because they both resided in New York, as anything else.

12. Edward Teller, op. cit.

13. Ibid.

14. Ronald Clark, Einstein: The Life and Times (New York: World Publishing, 1971).

15. Letters made available to this author from the Sachs file at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

16. The account of the meeting with FDR comes from various sources, including James MacGregor Burns, op cit.

17. James MacGregor Burns, op. cit. Edward Taylor, op cit.

18. Winston Churchill, The Second World War (Boston, 1953). His intent, though masked in hyperbolic language, is nonetheless clear.

19. See Warren, Kimball, ed. Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, Vols. 1–3 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).

20. See N. Blaedel, Harmony and Unity: The Life and Times of Niels Bohr (Madison, Wisconsin: Science Tech, 1988). Heisenberg is widely believed to have deliberately sabotaged the German program.

21. Hopkins, as FDR’s most trusted aide, is clearly the only person who could have carried out this sensitive mission.

22. N. Blaedel, op. cit.

23. Ibid. Bohr believes that the meeting had in some way been manipulated to occur by British intelligence, who reportedly had assets in both the U.S. and Russian bomb projects.

24. James MacGregor Burns, op. cit.

25. In retrospect, the young doctor should not have been surprised—such conditions are common in what is called post-polio syndrome. FDR had suffered from polio since the mid-1920s.

26. Lyndon LaRouche has correctly pointed out that the removal of Wallace, who was loyal to FDR’s intent and policies, meant that with Roosevelt’s death, those policies could be quickly ended. The world of a President Wallace would have been quite a different one from that of a President Truman. See Robert L. Baker, op. cit.

27. James MacGregor Burns, op. cit. Warren Kimball, op. cit.

28. See Henry Stimson, and MacGeorge Bundy. On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, William Sloane Associates, 1948). While Stimson is self-serving in his reporting, his doubts about the atomic bombing are supported by other contemporary accounts and sources. See also Charles Mee, Jr., Meeting at Potsdam (New York: Dell, 1975).

29. Logs, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.

30. The 1941 peace overtures are discussed in John Toland, The Rising Sun, Vols. 1, 2 (New York: Random House, 1979). The back-channel discussions were recounted and documented by former OSS agent Max Corvo in discussions with EIR News Service. The existence of the back channel is also amply documented by Martin Quigley, Peace Without Hiroshima (New York: Madison Books, 1991).

31. James MacGreggor Burns, op. cit. FDR reportedly repeated this formulation to several people, but there is no record that he ever gives explicit instructions to Stimson about his intent.

32. Max Corvo, op. cit; Martin Quigley, op. cit.

33. Max Corvo, op. cit.

34. Niels Bohr, op. cit; James Macgregor Burns, op. cit.

35. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, op. cit.

36. Warren Kimball, op. cit.

37. Charles Mee, Jr., op. cit.

38. According to contemporary  news accounts, Byrnes had sufficient delegate strength to block a Wallace re-nomination and to have himself placed on the ticket at the 1944 Democratic Party Convention. He had behind him key anti-FDR party bosses, including former FDR ally Jim Farley, as well as the so-called “Dixiecrat” bloc of southern delegates. It was speculated at the time that FDR reluctantly pushed Wallace off the ticket, and had the Vice Presidential nomination offered to the nonentity Truman to block the ambitious Byrnes, whom he never wanted to see in the White House. Byrnes felt that he had been double-crossed by FDR. See James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper Bros., 1958).

39. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Franklin (Kingport, Tennessee: Kingport Press, 1947).

40. Charles Mee, Jr., op. cit. in his own memoirs. Byrnes knew that no such surrender could happen without a signal about keeping Emperor Hirohito. He therefore advised the President to make no such explicit or even implicit offer, stating that FDR had been unequivocal on “unconditional surrender,” and that any change would actually delay any cessation of hostilities by showing weakness.

41. James F. Byrnes, op. cit.

42. Ibid.

43. Charles Mee, Jr., op. cit. In his own memoir, Byrnes makes no mention of the real intent to drop the bomb on Japan for its effect on the Russians.

44. Henry Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, op. cit.

45. Charles Mee, Jr., op cit.

46. John Toland, op cit. Unless otherwise cited, the source for the accounts of Japanese deliberations is Toland’s book.

47. Charles Mee, Jr., op. cit.

48. Ibid. Unless otherwise cited, the course for descriptions and discussions of Truman’s and others’ actions at or on the way to and back from Potsdam, is from Charles Mee, Jr.’s book.

49. This is actually done by Truman on July 24, when, after a session of the conference, he walks over to Stalin on the other side of the table, and tells him in vague terms that the United States has tested a new kind of bomb, that it works, and is available for use. Stalin offered his congratulations. See James F. Byrnes, op. cit.

50. For those with a strong stomach, see Winston Churchill, op. cit.

51. Truman, in remarks to Department of State historians in January 1956, admitted that he had full knowledge of the Japanese communiqués prior to making the decision to drop the bomb.

52. Lyndon LaRouche, et al., op. cit.

53. Charles Mee, Jr., op. cit.